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Abstract 
The development of mechanisms to target specific countries for human rights abuses was part 
of the campaign against apartheid at the UN in the 1960s. This campaign led to reform of the 
UN Commission on Human Rights, which turned it from a purely “promotional” or precatory 
body into one with an active mandate to protect individuals from human rights abuses 
perpetrated by their own state. The institutional politics of human rights at the Commission 
was plagued by claims of “double standards” and inter-bloc defensiveness. This article argues 
that the reform of the Commission in the 1960s and the way that its mechanisms were used in 
the 1970s defined the Commission’s politics in a way that led to its eventual demise in the 
early 2000s.  
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Introduction 
 
The history of the UN Commission on Human Rights, which was eventually dissolved in 
acrimonious circumstances in 2006 and replaced by the UN Human Rights Council, 
demonstrates how the international campaign against apartheid in South Africa shaped 
international organizations. The role of the anti-apartheid campaign in driving institutional 
reform is evident from many General Assembly and Commission on Human Rights 
resolutions. Collective action by the newly independent states of Africa and Asia, which 
joined the UN after gaining their independence, led to a reshaping of the institutional 
structure of the UN Commission on Human Rights and the development of the first “name-
and-shame” international legal mechanism. It also forced the creation of the first mechanism 
that allowed individuals to directly petition the UN with claims that their rights were being 
abused. 
 
The campaign against apartheid is an underestimated moment in human rights history, which 
for many years had revolved around highly Eurocentric milestones of intellectual and 
institutional history.2 Samuel Moyn argued that anti-colonialism does not really “fit into” the 
“historiography of human rights.” He saw the African nations’ struggle for independence 
from colonial rule as being outside the Western tradition of civil and political rights, which 
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focused on the rights of the individual rather than collective rights such as national self-
determination.3 This view has come in for some criticism. Besides criticizing Moyn, other 
historians have considered decolonization in the mid-twentieth century as a major historical 
factor that drove reform of the international treatment of human rights.4 Steven Jensen’s 
history of decolonization, for example, explores how newly independent states sought 
substantive changes in the law of human rights and in the way human rights were treated in 
international relations.5 From 1962, Jensen argues, respect for human rights law became 
important for the development of friendly relations between states, and resulted in the 
Helsinki Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in the 1970s.6 
Historical accounts have not focused much on the way the powers of relevant UN bodies 
evolved. Institutional histories of the UN have mentioned the campaign against apartheid that 
dominated the UN General Assembly for much of the 1970s, but only in passing.7 Other 
histories view the anti-apartheid campaign as more central to the history of the UN, but they 
have not offered a detailed analysis of its impact on the UN’s institutional development.8  
 
This article argues that the campaign against apartheid by the newly independent states 
resulted in institutional changes in the way the UN Commission on Human Rights operated, 
empowering it to investigate human rights abuses in various countries and allowing 
individuals to petition the Commission for redress of human rights abuses from which they 
were suffering. The Commission was originally created with an explicitly limited set of 
powers that did not include investigating human rights abuses. As the first two sections of 
this article describe, new mechanisms emerged in response to apartheid, and the Commission 
took on broader powers as well.  
 
The “rational design” theory of international organizations maintains that states construct 
international institutions in order to advance certain common goals. The design of the 
institutional structures then authorizes or encourages specific behaviors.9 This is different 
from the “rational institution” analysis of international organizations, which sees such 
organizations as helping states maximize their individual interests. The latter analysis focuses 
on how states use organizations for their own ends, rather than how an organization’s powers 
are shaped.10 As Barbara Koremenos summarizes it, rational design theorists examine how 
“states and other international actors shape institutions to solve the specific cooperation 
problems that they face,” meaning that “design variations are largely the result of rational, 
purposeful interactions.”11 As the second section of this article argues, the new mechanisms 
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the Commission developed in the 1960s were specifically designed as a response to apartheid 
in South Africa. That meant that the Commission ran into difficulty when the mechanisms 
were invoked outside of the South African context in the 1970s and 1980s.  
 
The third section of this article argues that in the politics of the Commission in the 1970s, 
states from different geographic and ideological blocs stymied the further use of its powers. 
What were called at the time “double standards” on human rights emerged in part because of 
the way Commission procedures were designed. Apartheid was framed as an impediment to 
post-colonial self-determination, not as an abuse of basic human rights. This meant that 
equivalent situations outside of South Africa were ignored or blocked from consideration, as 
can be seen from numerous contemporary accounts of the Commission’s work, some of 
which are discussed below. The Commission found that its investigative powers were caught 
up in Cold War power politics, and its ability to consider petitions from individuals was 
subject to the control of states voting in blocs. This had long-term consequences.  
 
By the late 1990s, the Commission was being widely criticized for its ineffectiveness and 
politicization, and for the way influential states could block scrutiny of their allies. For 
example, by 2000 China had escaped censure of its human rights record several times, either 
by relying on the protection of its allies, often secured by providing economic inducements to 
other states to support its positions. The 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre was never even 
considered by the Commission.12 In a 2001 New York Times editorial, the Director of 
Human Rights Watch criticized the way “the world's despots and tyrants” were able to “join 
the commission to protect themselves from criticism and to undermine its work.”13 This 
article argues that one of the underdiscussed causes of the “credibility crisis” that crippled the 
Commission in its later years was the way the Commission’s powers and procedures were 
designed and the way they shaped some states’ behavior.14 Even though much of this 
happened in the 1970s, it established a set of expectations surrounding the Commission’s 
operations which was to persist for the rest of its lifetime.  
 
The Commission on Human Rights and the Context of its Powers in the UN 
 
When the UN Charter was being drafted, western states were hostile to the idea of an 
independent human rights mechanism. The British and Australians successfully blocked 
proposals by the Philippines and Chile at the 1945 San Francisco conference to create an 
independent investigative organization with its own bill of rights.15 The Commission on 
Human Rights was set up in 1946 as a sub-body of the UN Economic and Social Council 
(ECOSOC). Its membership was decided upon by a “slate vote” of ECOSOC members, 
which meant that a list of countries proposed for membership by each of the UN’s regional 
groupings was automatically approved by the other states. The Commission met annually in 
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Geneva for six weeks. It was what legal scholars classify as a “political” organization in that 
it was comprised of state representatives, rather than independent experts, and depended on 
political processes and pressure rather than international legal obligations to guide its 
decisions.16 A sub-commission of the Human Rights Commission on the Prevention of 
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities (the Sub-Commission) was set up in 1947 to 
conduct studies and make recommendations to the Commission on preventing discrimination 
against minorities. It was comprised of twelve independent experts selected by the 
Commission, who were expected to act in their individual capacities, making it an expert, not 
a political body. In its first decade, the Commission spent much of its time drafting human 
rights covenants which turned the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) into two 
binding international treaties: the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). 
 
The Commission did accept complaints from individuals, but they had to be reviewed in 
complete confidence with no follow up action allowed. Most of these complaints took the 
form of petitions from individuals pleading in general terms for UN assistance. Information 
about the complaints received between 1951 and 1952 shows that the majority were from 
refugees from Eastern Europe who were concerned with religious liberties or political 
freedoms.17 Nothing could be done about these complaints, however, and they simply piled 
up at the UN’s headquarters. In a 1951 article, Edgar Turlington, an American academic, 
described the Commission’s functions as advancing the values contained in the UDHR by 
“teaching and education and by progressive measures.”18 In the mid-1950s, a variety of 
proposals to expand the UN’s power to enforce human right standards were mooted, 
including a proposal from Sri Lanka to create an international criminal court and from 
Uruguay to create a UN Attorney-General.19 The United States proposed some reforms to the 
Commission but these were dismissed by contemporary commentators as a “euphemism for 
inaction” driven by short-term political motivations.20 ECOSOC Resolutions in 1947 and 
1959 on handling individual petitions affirmed that the Commission had “no power to take 
action,” leaving the Commission and the Sub-Commission with no mechanism at all to 
advocate for or protect human rights within member states.21  
 
Prior to the late 1950s, African and Asian states were under-represented on the Commission, 
and colonies had no representation in the UN at all. From the late 1950s onwards, 
decolonization resulted in more states from Asia and Africa joining the UN. These newly 
independent states required a collective grouping to assert their own identities and promote 
their own policy agendas at the UN, where many crucial institutions were dominated by the 
former colonialist states.22 This grouping came to be known as the Third World bloc—
although the use of the term “Third World” has been the subject of fierce debate because it 
has connotations of underdevelopment and inferiority and can be interpreted as a semiotic 
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21 Manfred Nowak, “The Promotion and Protection of Human Rights by the United Nations,” Netherlands 
Human Rights Quarterly 6, No. 1 (1988): 5–29, here 13. 
22 Mohammed Ayoob, “The Third World in the System of States: Acute Schizophrenia or Growing Pains?” 
International Studies Quarterly 33, No. 1 (1989): 67–79, doi: 10.2307/2600494. 
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endorsement of western supremacy.23 The term “Third World” was first used in 1952 by 
Alfred Sauvy, the director of France’s Institut National d'Études Demographiques in France. 
It was later popularized by the anti-colonialist scholar Frantz Fanon in his book, The 
Wretched of the Earth.24 The 1955 Bandung Conference saw an early restatement of the 
collective ideology of what would later become the Third World bloc at the UN. At the 
conference, the Indian Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, stated that “Asia and Africa must 
play an increasing role in [the UN’s] conduct and destiny.” The final communiqué called for 
the newly independent states of Africa and Asia to be admitted to the UN and to be granted 
an “equitable geographical distribution” of Security Council seats. The communiqué situated 
institutional reform at the heart of the policies promoted by what would later become the 
Third World bloc.25  
 
In order to promote equal representation as its membership was rapidly increasing, the UN 
established a system of regional groupings in 1963. The largest wave of new entrants to the 
UN came between 1959 and 1962 as a result of decolonization in Africa. The system of 
regional groupings, which is still in existence today, divides UN member states into five 
geographic blocs: African, Asian, Latin American and Caribbean, Eastern Europe, and 
Western European and Other (a designation that includes North America). Member states 
from the blocs each control a proportion of the positions on UN bodies. Blocs often acted 
collectively, voting along common ideological lines in the General Assembly and in other 
international organizations. Postcolonial states mostly belonged to the African and Asian 
blocs, while the former colonialist states generally belonged to the Western and Other bloc. 
The “Third World” bloc, as it came to be called, was an ideological grouping that consisted 
of the African and Asian blocs along with other states that occasionally shared its priorities. 
There are a wealth of contemporary sources that show that in the 1960s and 1970s the term 
“Third World” was used interchangeably with other names such as the “Group of 77” and the 
“Non-Aligned Movement” to describe the bloc of newly decolonized states in various UN 
bodies. Some historians have argued that the term “Third World bloc” can be used to describe 
the shared ideological agenda of African and Asian states at the UN during this period. Hence 
the term “Third World bloc” was used to describe the ideological alignment of states from the 
African and Asian geographic blocs at the UN, rather than the term “Third World state,” 
which would reinforce inequality and colonial-era presumptions of inferiority.26  
 
How the Third World Bloc’s Anti-Apartheid Campaign Reshaped the Commission 
 
The struggle against apartheid was one of the core issues on the Third World bloc’s agenda. 
South Africa first came before the UN as a cause in 1946, when the General Assembly voted 
in favor of a resolution demanding that South Africa treat its Indian citizens in conformity 
with the UN Charter.27 The South African prime minister, Jan Smuts, argued that UN 
members had no obligations in regard to the protection of human rights that required the 
                                                 
23   Arturo Escobar, Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World (New Jersey: 
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South African government to abolish apartheid. Between 1952 and 1954, the General 
Assembly repeatedly condemned apartheid as a form of racial discrimination contrary to the 
“higher interests of humanity.” It authorized the creation of an expert commission to 
investigate the situation relating to apartheid, but little came of such declarations.28 Broadly 
speaking, the overall thrust of the General Assembly in the 1950s was to initiate a dialogue 
with the South African government to address the problems caused by apartheid laws, rather 
than exert some form of overt political pressure or condemn apartheid as a violation of 
international human rights standards.29 Still, the South African government refused to engage 
with the UN, claiming that any UN action constituted an interference with their national 
sovereignty.  
 
At the beginning of the 1960s, three things escalated the severity of the UN’s approach 
towards apartheid. Firstly, African nations that had gained independence, in particular Ghana, 
took seats in the UN and began to advocate strongly for harsher sanctions against apartheid.30 
Secondly, General Assembly Resolution 1514 established the general principle of support for 
decolonization in international law. It was based on a general sense that minority rule in 
Africa was illegitimate from both a moral and legal perspective.31 Finally, the events of early 
1960—British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan’s “winds of change” speech, where he 
called on governments not to stand in the way of decolonization, and the massacre of 
protestors at Sharpeville in South Africa—led to increased criticism of South Africa.  
 
General Assembly Resolution 1699 created a special committee for territories under 
Portuguese rule. In 1962, the General Assembly, after examining reports from this 
committee, passed a resolution “deploring the continued disregard by the Portuguese 
Government” for the liberation aspirations of the people in its African colonies. The General 
Assembly urged all states “to refrain forthwith . . . from any assistance which would enable it 
to continue its repression.”32 Some authors argue that General Assembly Resolution 2144 in 
1966 was the turning point. It urged ECOSOC and the Commission to improve the UN’s 
capacity to prevent human rights violations.33 Resolution 2144 was specifically framed in 
terms of the UN’s “interest in combating policies of apartheid” and the preamble referred 
extensively to apartheid, minority rule and Portuguese colonialism.34 Nine of the fourteen 
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31 The UN had become distinctly anti-colonial by 1965. See Rupert Emerson, “Colonialism, Political 
Development and the UN,” International Organization 19, No. 3 (1965): 484–503. 
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Assembly, 17th session, 1962, December 14, 
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33 Bertrand Ramcharan, Contemporary Human Rights Ideas: Rethinking Theory and Practice (Oxford: 
Routledge, 2008), 131–132. 
34 “Question of the violation of human rights and fundamental freedoms, including policies of racial 
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substantive points in the resolution referenced apartheid and anti-colonialism. Only three of 
them referred, directly or indirectly, to the protection of human rights. 
 
The anti-apartheid campaigns of the Third World bloc also had an impact on the rapid 
advancement of anti-racism measures in international human rights law, which culminated in 
the 1965 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD). The 
1963 General Assembly Resolution on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 
built on CERD, advocating independence for peoples living under colonial rule and 
condemning the racial discrimination underlying colonialism. It was strongly supported by 
states from the Third World bloc.35 The speed with which CERD entered into force—it took 
less than four years for enough states to ratify the treaty for it to take effect—was indicative 
of the success of the concerted campaign run by the Third World bloc to enact CERD.36 At 
the Commission, one major priority of the newly independent states was including the right 
to self-determination into the two human rights covenants—the ICCPR and the ICESCR. The 
covenants gave the right to be free of colonialism that was embodied in General Assembly 
Resolution 1514 additional legal force. By the late 1960s, the number of states in the Third 
World bloc had increased in all UN institutions. The political focus shifted to institutional 
reforms, which altered both the nature of the Commission and enhanced institutional 
opposition to apartheid overall.  
 
Institutionalizing Anti-Apartheid: The 1235 Procedure 
 
The first major reform of an existing institution that resulted from the Third World bloc’s 
campaign against apartheid was ECOSOC Resolution 1235, passed in August 1967. The 
request to ECOSOC for action came from the Commission in early 1967. It was based on an 
expert report presented at the Commission’s 23rd session, which was strongly supported by 
the Third World bloc states.37 Under the final version of Resolution 1235, the Commission 
and the Sub-Commission were empowered to consider “violations of human rights . . . 
including policies of racial discrimination and segregation and of apartheid” along with the 
power to investigate and study specific “human rights abuses.”38 While it seemed 
inconsequential, the resolution for the first time granted the Commission the power to single 
out a specific state for committing human rights abuses against its own citizens.39 It is 
debatable whether the reference to apartheid was meant to limit the procedure to human 
rights abuses in South Africa or whether this was merely an illustration of a situation where 
the Commission should act.40 Article 3 of Resolution 1235 stated that the Commission’s 
                                                                                                                                                        
discrimination and segregation and of apartheid, in all countries, with particular reference to colonial and 
other dependent countries and territories,” Resolution No. 2144 (XXI), adopted by the General Assembly, 
21th session, October 26, 1966, https://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/6316(SUPP), 46–47; 
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35 “United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,” Resolution No. 
1904 (XVIII), adopted by the General Assembly, 18th session, November 20, 1963 
https://undocs.org/en/A/RES/1904(XVIII). 
36 Theodor Meron, “The Meaning and Reach of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Racial Discrimination,” American Journal of International Law 79, No. 2 (1985): 283–381, here 284, doi: 
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37 Tolley, “United Nations Commission,” 56.  
38 Ibid. 
39 See Conall Mallory, “Membership and the UN Human Rights Council,” Canadian Journal of Human Rights 
2, No. 1 (2013): 1–38. 
40 Kevin Boyle, “The United Nations Human Rights Council: Origins, Antecedents, and Prospects” in New 
Institutions for Human Rights Protection, ed. Kevin Boyle (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 11–49, 
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investigatory powers were confined to cases such as those “exemplified by the policy of 
apartheid as practised in the Republic of South Africa.”41 Except for one reference in 
paragraph 5, which stated that the new powers were meant to assist the Commission in 
“discharge[ing] functions in relation to violations of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms,” all of the other references to human rights in the text of Resolution 1235 linked 
their protection to “the policy of apartheid as practiced in the Republic of South Africa and in 
the Territory of South West Africa.”42 
 
During the drafting process, Cameroon and Algeria had sided with the USSR, which argued 
that resolution should be limited to situations of colonial rule, but the final wording seemed to 
use apartheid as an inclusive, not an exclusive term. Nevertheless, the phrasing of the 
provision, in particular the specificity of the location the abuses—“the Republic of South 
Africa and in the Territory of South West Africa”—meant that some states could argue that 
investigations should not occur outside of that context. Resolution 1235 was still seen by 
some contemporary authors as a significant step forward, which allowed the consideration of 
human rights abuses in other countries. In October 1967, it was used to discuss the situations 
in Greece and Haiti.43 Other authors have considered 1235 as the start of a process of 
institutional reform at the Commission, which began to move it toward an institutional 
system for protecting individual rights.44 It definitely inverted the presumption in Article 2(7) 
of the Charter of the United Nations that UN bodies should not “intervene in matters which 
are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state.”45 Commenting on the impact of 
Resolution 1235 twenty-five years later, Thomas Buergenthal, a former member of the UN 
Human Rights Committee, praised the Commission for “pierc[ing] the veil of state 
sovereignty and allowing for human rights protection.”46  
 
In 1967, the Commission membership had expanded to accommodate the many new states 
joining the UN. Now, with fourteen African and Asian member states and the added support 
of the twelve states from the Latin American and the Eastern European blocs that created 
alliances on an issue by issue basis, the Third World bloc could count on between 45% and 
75% of the voting power on the Commission. From 1970 to 1980, around 8% of all 
Commission meetings focused on South Africa specifically. Counting meetings on the issues 
of racism and self-determination—issues which were proxies for attacking minority rule and 
apartheid in South Africa—the Commission cumulatively spent about a quarter of its time on 
apartheid.47 Given the strong opposition to apartheid that members of the Third World bloc 
had expressed in the UN prior to the expansion of the Commission and the passage of 
Resolution 1235, it is difficult to conceive that the Commission would have departed from its 
                                                                                                                                                        
here 24. 
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45 Charter of the United Nations, signed 1945, June 26, Article 2(7), https://www.un.org/en/sections/un-
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46 Thomas Buergenthal’s remarks at the 87th Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law (2 
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purely “promotional” mandate without the growing urgency of apartheid as an issue. Yet the 
structure of Resolution 1235 led some states to argue that the Sub-Commission should not 
investigate matters outside South Africa and other minority-ruled territories in southern 
Africa, even though significant racial discrimination existed in other African states.48 The 
1235 procedure was bound to attract a degree of hostility. As Kevin Boyle observes, even 
though the Third World bloc had instigated the resolution, they proved as “reluctant as other 
states” for it to be used against them.49 As Boyle goes on to note, there was a particular 
hostility to using the mechanisms “engineered [to tackle] apartheid, colonialism and Israel” 
against states that were members of the Third World bloc. The final paragraph of 1235 made 
it clear that ad-hoc study groups the Commission created would be nominally independent.50 
Despite this notional independence, their creation was under the control of the Commission, 
which itself was under the control of the member states elected to it. This allowed voting 
blocs to be gate-keepers of who would be subject to the 1235 procedure. 
 
An Individual Petition Mechanism: The 1503 Procedure 
 
The individual complaints procedure, known as the 1503 procedure, allowed individuals to 
send the Commission petitions or communications detailing human rights abuses by their 
governments, which would then be discussed in confidence at the Sub-Commission’s annual 
sessions in Geneva.51 The case for letting the Commission receive individual petitions had 
been made for many years, but ECOSOC had resisted granting it this kind of power.52 In July 
1959, an ECOSOC resolution rejected allowing individual petitions, which were described by 
one contemporary source as “the most elaborate wastepaper basket ever designed.”53 Support 
for individual petitions changed after 1960, when more African and Asian states joined the 
General Assembly and sought election to the Commission. However, as Roland Burke notes, 
their support was limited to their “two main preoccupations . . . apartheid and colonialism.”54 
There was considerable support from the Third World bloc for allowing both the Committee 
on Decolonization (the Committee of Twenty-Four) and another committee to hear petitions 
under CERD. Campaigning by the Committee of Twenty-Four—the General Assembly group 
formed to investigate decolonization—on the issue of apartheid and decolonization led 
ECOSOC to reconsider accepting individual petitions. During the drafting process of 
resolution 1503, Tanzania tried unsuccessfully to introduce provisions that would require the 
Sub-Commission to focus exclusively on colonial situations and apartheid.55 Other states 
from the Third World bloc, along with Eastern European states, were critical of allowing any 
                                                 
48 Warren Weinstein, “Africa's Approach to Human Rights at the United Nations,” African Issues 6, No. 4 
(1976): 14–21, here 19, doi: 10.1017/S1548450500000664.  
49 Boyle, “The United Nations Human Rights Council,” 27. 
50 The control of the Commission over the agenda and consideration of the Sub-commission was already 
observed in 1967. See John P. Humphrey, “The United Nations Sub-Commission on the Prevention of 
Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities,” The American Journal of International Law 62, No. 4 
(1968): 869–888, here 886. 
51 For an overview of these procedures, see M. E. Tardu, “United Nations Response to Gross Violations of 
Human Rights: The 1503 Procedure,” Santa Clara Law Review 20, No. 3 (1980): 559–602; Howard Tolley, 
“Decision Making at the United Nations Commission on Human Rights,” Human Rights Quarterly 5, No. 1 
(1983): 27–58. 
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23, No. 2 (1979): 186–215, 202. 
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individual petition procedure outside of South Africa.56 Most Third World bloc states on the 
Commission voted against the initial proposal for an individual petition mechanism for the 
Sub-Commission in 1968, but it passed the Commission by the narrowest of margins.57 It was 
only after a successful Tanzanian proposal to have communications be considered in 
confidence, increasing the power of the Commission over their handling, that many states 
from the Third World bloc became supportive of the new procedure. This proved important 
to its eventual passage in ECOSOC in 1970, where the Third World bloc states refused to 
join the Eastern European states in bloc voting to oppose the resolution.  
 
Patrick Flood argues that the 1503 procedure was “designed to provide a way for the Sub-
Commission to evaluate situations amounting to consistent patterns of gross violations” of 
human rights.58 European human rights activists initially praised the 1503 procedure for 
providing a forum for individuals to petition against their governments’ human rights abuses. 
Yet, the procedure, while it provided an extensive mechanism for the processing of individual 
complaints, did not make the communications it received public until the end of the process, 
when recommendations were transmitted to ECOSOC. Nor did it actually make the 
individual victim a party to the proceedings; as Tardu notes, under the 1503 procedure the 
individual “plaintiff is an information transmitter” and there was no entitlement to have their 
communication considered.59 The petitions were processed by an expert working group and 
then referred to the Sub-Commission for consideration—around six to eight petitions out of 
the hundreds received each year were processed during each Commission session. There was 
no mechanism for processing urgent petitions while the Sub-Commission was not in session. 
According to Tolley, this contributed to the Commission’s failure to process complaints 
received about the Greek military junta in 1974.60 It was only in the final stage of 
consideration, after interstate dialogue had failed to yield results, that the substance of a 
communication could be made public by the Commission as a means of “shaming” the state 
in question for its human rights violations.61 In summary, the enforcement powers under the 
1503 procedure were entirely dependent upon what Bertrand Ramcharan has described as 
bringing the “international presence to bear upon a situation.”62  
 
Shaming and political pressure at the international level can sometimes be effective at 
triggering human rights reform in individual countries. The shaming institutionalized in the 
1503 procedure was designed to pressure states into making reforms to address their human 
rights violations.63 However, for this to work it required the 1503 procedure to be applied 
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the-economic-and-social-council.  
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Stephen C. Ropp, Thomas Risse, and Kathryn Sikkink (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 1–
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consistently and to all states where human rights abuses were taking place. Consistency in the 
application of powers is an important factor in the development of the content-independent 
legitimacy of an international institution—the notion that an institution is itself legitimate, 
regardless of the results or outcomes of its decisions.64 The control that the Commission had 
over the 1503 process was applied in a manner that reflected the prevailing ideological 
consensus or collective interests of particular blocs. This control was enabled by the structure 
of Resolution 1503, which contained only one reference to “violations of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms” in its preamble and no other description of what would constitute 
behavior that would trigger consideration under the procedure.65 Attempts by the United 
States in 1968 to introduce a list of practices which constitute human rights violations into the 
text of the procedure—such as “torture” or “violation of freedom of expression”—were not 
formally adopted by the Sub-Commission and hence did not make it into the final draft of the 
ECOSOC resolution.66 This meant that the Commission could in effect interpret for itself 
what constituted a “violation” of human rights, as it was required to do under section 6 of the 
procedure for determining whether a violation was severe enough to require investigation or 
further action.67 When the Commission’s membership was expanded in 1967, which as noted 
above increased the Third World bloc’s overall voting power, the Third World bloc wielded 
greater interpretative control over the procedure, increasing support for it to be used in the 
anti-apartheid cause even though it was not specifically mentioned in Resolution 1503.  
 
How the Commission’s Procedural Reforms Shaped its Politics 
 
The new legal structures of the UN, which were shaped by the Third World bloc’s anti-
apartheid pressure in the late 1960s, influenced the Commission’s politics in the 1970s and 
early 1980s. During this time the politics of the Commission were criticized for being 
dominated by “double standards.” A double standard means that different criteria are applied 
to situations which are so similar that they merit equal treatment.68 For example, Laurie 
Weisberg notes that at the Commission “no parallel was drawn between the exploitation of 
the Ethiopian peasant and the exploitation of the South Africa squatter,” even though both 
were exploited by their governments and denied political rights.69 There was no obvious 
justification as to why human rights abuses committed by the Amin regime in Uganda were 
not worthy of the Sub-Committee’s attention, especially when other racist regimes were 
under investigation. As Onyeonoro Kamanu noted in the mid-1970s, attempts to argue that 
human rights abuses committed by the governments of some newly independent states 
against their own populations were somehow distinct from human rights abuses committed 
by the white regime in South Africa often ended up implicitly defending intra-racial 
domination of one group over another.70  
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While the political forces at the Commission were frequently accused of applying “double 
standards,” especially by contemporary commentators in the 1970s and 1980s, the term is too 
reductive.71 Instead, it makes sense to distinguish three inter-related arguments about the 
application of the 1235 and 1503 procedures that were made by some states in response to 
how the Commission exercised its new powers. All of these arguments were linked to the 
design of the 1235 and 1503 procedures. They shaped the political template of the 
Commission for the future.  
 
Restrictive Interpretation of the Commission’s Powers  
 
The Commission’s powers were interpreted in the context of defensiveness about sovereignty 
in the Third World bloc, resulting in changes to international human rights law and the 
institutions designed to protect them. Anti-colonial independence movements made frequent 
appeals for protection of human rights. In a 1959 speech, Julius Nyrere said that 
independence was a fight “for our rights as human beings,” and that it was ludicrous to think 
that after independence Tanzanians were going to turn around and say “to hell with all this 
nonsense about human rights.”72 Human rights served as a useful rallying point in anti-
colonial struggles, but the power to investigate human rights abuses was not fully 
institutionalized in an organization.73 As Meredith Terretta notes, decolonization engineered a 
tension between human rights activists and the governments of their newly independent 
states, which were determined to cement their newly acquired political authority.74 Roland 
Burke observed that before and after the Bandung conference, representatives of Third World 
governments displayed little awareness of the “potential antagonism between rights and 
sovereignty.”75 At the first World Conference on Human Rights held in Tehran in 1968, 
states from the Third World bloc clearly associated defending their sovereignty with 
arguments about substantive reform of international human rights law.76  
 
At the Commission, sovereignty was a more complex issue. Many states could agree that 
there were some states that no doubt deserved to be targeted by the 1235 and 1503 
procedures. However, they were more cautious about the expansive use of any of the 
Commission’s new powers. A number of states consistently objected to the 1503 procedure 
on the grounds that it expanded the powers of a UN body in a manner that was inconsistent 
with the purposes of the UN and the protection of state sovereignty.77 However, as Jakob 
Möller notes, the majority of states that were members of the Commission recognized that 
both procedures were “within the realm of Articles 55 and 56 of the [UN] Charter,” which 
committed states to take action to achieve respect for fundamental principles such as human 
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rights.78 That did not stop states from contesting the Commission’s competence when it was 
in their interest to do so. During the 1970s, as the Commission and Sub-Commission began to 
accept individual cases for consideration, some states such as Pakistan, India, and Ethiopia 
argued for restrictive approaches to utilizing the Commission’s powers.79 Other states from 
the Third World bloc, such as Senegal, were much more open to the Commission’s use of its 
new powers.80 In 1981, the Brazilian representative maintained that the Sub-Commission 
lacked the authority to criticize nations for their human rights records and that the role of the 
Commission was simply to receive information.81 Article Six of Resolution 1503 does not 
explicitly give the Sub-Commission or the Commission the power to condemn states, and 
when it is read in tandem with Article Seven and Eight, which require investigative measures 
to in cooperation with the state in question and to keep any work confidential, it is hard to 
construct such a power.82  
 
Yet, as Ton Gardeniers et al. have noted, by the early 1980s it was quite clear that the 
Commission had in effect adopted this understanding of its powers under its new 
procedures.83 This was not a phenomenon that was specific to the 1503 procedure and the 
Commission; theorists of international organizations have noted that institutional structures 
often evolve beyond the parameters originally anticipated by the states that designed them.84 
This can especially happen when an organization has investigative or adjudicative functions. 
As Brian Simpson observes, it would have been a struggle to ratify the European Convention 
on Human Rights in the 1950s if states had foreseen a future where the European Court of 
Human Rights would be defined by its “intrusiveness into what were once viewed as purely 
domestic matters.”85 Defending sovereignty, although it was a core argument in the 
Commission, was less important than arguments about where to apply the Commission’s 
new-found powers. There was a reasonable consensus that human rights abuses ought to be 
investigated but more of a dispute about which states should be the subject of such 
investigations.  
 
Inter-bloc Shielding 
 
Many who write about the behavior of the Third World bloc have noted the collective 
solidarity between its member states. This solidarity served both an ideological function, in 
that it sought to project a set of shared values, and an instrumental function, providing newly 
independent states with a system of support in international organizations.86 Collective 
solidarity included what can be described as “inter-bloc shielding”—the use of formal 
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mechanisms or rhetorical appeals to deflect or steer institutional procedures for protection of 
human rights away from fellow states in the same bloc. Rupert Emerson, writing in 1975, 
observed that systematic human rights abuses, such as the massacres in Rwanda in 1965 and 
forced deportations from Ghana, were overlooked, ignored and in some cases even defended 
by the Third World bloc at the Commission.87 Delegates from the Third World bloc blocked 
discussion of discriminatory practices in Ghana and Tanzania by the Sub-Commission.88 This 
did not necessarily mean that states were always successful in blocking consideration of 
communications from citizens of Third World states. For example, in 1977 the Sub-
Commission considered a petition from Jehovah’s Witnesses in Malawi alleging that the 
government was attempting to ban them from practicing their religion. The Commission first 
received petitions alleging serious human rights abuses in Equatorial Guinea in 1974, which 
the Sub-Commission considered in confidence in 1975. But the skepticism of some states in 
the Commission delayed further action on the subject for over two years, during which time 
the Macias Nguema regime went on what can only be described as an unconstrained killing 
spree.89 Eventually, in 1978, the Commission went public with some of the complaints that it 
had received from petitioners in states of the Third World bloc such as Ethiopia, Indonesia, 
Malawi and Equatorial Guinea. But there was little doubt, as Kevin Boyle noted, that bloc 
voting by members of the Commission was “restricting and frustrating its work.”90  
 
The ability of the Commission to control the use of 1235 and 1503 procedures was only part 
of the picture when it came to inter-bloc shielding. More important were structural 
ambiguities in the instruments themselves. There was doubt about whether the express 
references to apartheid in 1235 were only examples of situations where the Commission 
could act or actual constraints on the Commission’s power. Inter-bloc shielding actively 
supported the latter interpretation of the 1235 and a narrow interpretation of the situations 
where the 1503 procedure applied. When Uganda’s forcible expulsion of its Asian 
community came before the Sub-Commission in 1972, the Nigerian delegate to the 
Commission attempted to block consideration of it, arguing that the situation “was not a 
human rights abuse.”91 A number of Commission delegates argued that they should not 
concern themselves with matters outside South Africa and other minority-ruled states, even 
though what was going on in Uganda was in fact systemic racial discrimination of the sort 
that the Sub-Commission had a direct mandate to investigate.92 In March 1977, the Sub-
Commission was forced to abandon an investigation into systematic human rights abuses in 
Uganda, including the activities of government-sponsored death squads, in the face of 
political resistance from other African members of the Commission.93 After a group of 
Nordic countries proposed a General Assembly resolution condemning Uganda in 1978, 
African states from the Third World bloc negotiated a compromise—the resolution would not 
be debated or put to a vote and the situation was referred back to the Sub-Commission for 
investigation.94  
 
The Identification of “Certain States” for Criticism 
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Control of the Commission’s agenda and blocking maneuvers in respect of the 1235 process 
were used not only to protect some states from criticism but also to single out certain states as 
human rights violators. Between 1967 and 1974, only South Africa and Israel were the 
subjects of direct action under the 1235 procedure.95 Even there, care was taken to focus only 
on the situation within those two states and not on wider human rights issues. In a 1968 
debate on Israeli policies in the occupied Palestinian territories, the executions of dissidents 
in other countries, such as Iraq, were rejected by States from the Third World bloc as being 
purely domestic matters and outside the scope of the Commission.  The singling out of 
certain states (and exclusion of others) was a reflection of Cold War politics in many cases. In 
1969, Morris Abram recalled one delegate to the Commission (from an unnamed state) 
saying, “we’d like to condemn the Soviet Union for its repression of intellectuals; we’d like 
to condemn the United States because of Vietnam . . . we cannot afford to do either so we’ll 
support a condemnation of Israel.”96 During the 1970s, this state of affairs only escalated. 
Some states were protected by their parent bloc; the United States, for example, insisted on 
changing the Commission’s approach to the right-wing regime in Argentina because of its 
Cold War concerns.97 
 
The advancement by the Commission of Third World priorities in other areas, such as 
economic and social justice, led to claims during the 1970s by Western powers (and from the 
United States in particular) that the Commission was becoming “politicized.”98 Arguments 
about politicization ultimately favored a narrow, American-backed “functionalist” view of 
international organizations, which held that the Commission’s competencies should be 
confined to the powers it was originally granted by the states that created it.99 This would 
have meant rolling back the procedural innovations the Third World bloc had introduced. 
Accusations of double standards at the Commission provided cover for both the United States 
and the United Kingdom to dismiss the Commission’s actions and resist attempts to develop 
even more anti-apartheid international legal instruments in the late 1970s. Their stance may 
also have been a reflection of pro-apartheid sympathies among some in the governments of 
those states. During the Reagan administration in the 1980s, criticism that the Commission 
was “anti-Western” grew in strength. Many critics cited the growing power of the Third 
World bloc as proof.100 This was, however, deeply cynical, because at the same time the 
United States advanced this criticism, it was openly supporting authoritarian anti-communist 
regimes in Latin America. Jeane Kirkpatrick, U.S. Ambassador to the UN, went so far as to 
praise authoritarian regimes that left “in place existing allocations of wealth, power [and] 
status” and were as a consequence “more compatible with U.S. interests.”101  
                                                 
95 Complaints about other states were raised in debates. See Henning Boekle, “Western States, the UN 
Commission on Human Rights, and the ‘1235 Procedure’: the ‘Question of Bias’ Revisited,” Netherlands 
Quarterly of Human Rights 13, No. 4 (1995): 367–402, doi: 10.1177/016934419501300402. 
96 Morris Abram, “The U.N. and Human Rights,” Foreign Affairs 47, No. 2 (1969): 363–374, here 366. 
97 Sandy Vogelgesang, “Diplomacy of Human Rights,” International Studies Quarterly 23, No. 2 (1979): 216–
245. 
98 Gene M. Lyons, David A. Baldwin, and Donald W. McNemar, “The ‘Politicization’ Issue in the UN 
Specialized Agencies,” Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science 32, No. 4 (1977): 81–92, doi: 
10.2307/1173993.  
99 Ibid., 83. 
100 For an example of contemporary right-wing criticism, see Arieh Eilan, The General Assembly: Can It Be 
Salvaged (New York: Heritage Foundation, 1984). For a historical assessment, see Paul Kennedy, The 
Parliament of Man: The Past, Present, and Future of the United Nations (London: Penguin Books, 2006), 
188–191.  
101 Jeane Kirkpatrick, Dictatorships and Double Standards: Rationalism and Reason in Politics (New York: 
Simon and Schuster, 1982). 
16 
 
By the early 1980s, double standards at the Commission were evidently infuriating some UN 
officials. In a 1982 address to the 38th session of the Commission, the Director of the UN 
Human Rights Division, Theo van Boven, said that he found it “unacceptable...[that] gross 
violation of human rights in any country should not be discussed . . . simply because other 
situations have not been taken up as well.”102 It was clear that the Commission could only act 
in the case of an individual country when that country did not belong to any of the different 
competing blocs. For example, the right-wing regime in Chile became increasingly isolated 
from some of the major powers at the UN. Nor did the Third World bloc have much 
sympathy with the Pinochet regime, because had alienated itself from pro-Third World 
regimes in the Latin American region.103 From 1981 to 1985, the Commission issued a series 
of resolutions singling out Iran and Kampuchea (Cambodia), two states that had previously 
been defended by the Third World bloc, for engaging in systemic human rights abuses. 
However, this may have been a reflection of those states’ specific internal politics rather than 
a change in the attitude of any of the blocs. The process of considering cases under the 1503 
procedure remained in thrall to inter-bloc shielding.104 Some states were able to escape 
consideration in confidential sessions altogether: from 1984 onwards Pakistan was 
highlighted as a cause for concern at Commission meetings but it managed to escape referral 
to the Sub-Commission for action for years. In a particularly grisly coincidence, in 1988 the 
Commission halted an investigation of Iraq under the 1503 procedure just four days before 
Saddam Hussein’s government launched a nerve gas attack on Iraq’s Kurdish minority.105  
 
Conclusion: The Long-term Impact of the Commission  
 
By the end of the 1980s, the number of debates about apartheid decreased at the Commission 
as the South African regime began to collapse. However, the basic structure of politics at the 
Commission, with certain states being singled out for human rights criticism and others 
benefiting from inter-bloc shielding, began to evolve. In 1992, when the Commission again 
expanded in size, bloc voting continued to result in division. Condemnation of Cuba and 
Israel divided different factions. In the mid-1990s, disagreements over whether racism 
occurred in all societies or just in western societies sparked arguments about the mandate of 
the Commission’s Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Racism, Racial 
Discrimination, and Xenophobia.106 China was able to end the 1990s without ever having 
been subjected to a 1503 procedure. The United States defended Israel, but the Jewish state 
was targeted by all other states. The independence of the Sub-Commission and the legitimacy 
of both its procedures was increasingly questioned.107 By 2006, eventual replacement of the 
Commission by the creation of a new UN Human Rights Council was seen by many 
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commentators and scholars as the best response to the Commission’s credibility problems.108 
However, criticism of the Commission’s “politicization” in the 1990s missed the point.109 All 
human rights, and human rights institutions, are political because creating an instrument to 
protect rights involves deciding which rights to protect and which rights not to protect.110 The 
politicization of the UN Commission on Human Rights was structural. It originated in the 
way the 1235 and the 1503 procedures were designed in the 1960s and used in the 1970s. 
Applying the analytical framework of rational design—described in the introduction to this 
article—two features of the procedures highlight how the Third World bloc understood the 
problem of cooperation in protecting human rights. 
 
Firstly, both the 1235 and 1503 procedures reflected what is sometimes termed an 
“idiographic political assumption” about the roles of international law and international 
institutions. Commitment to and support for the 1235 and 1503 procedures demonstrated the 
social identity of the states that created them.111 In the case of the 1235 and 1503 procedures, 
condemning apartheid was part of the social identity of the newly independent states of 
Africa and Asia in the international sphere. Therefore, they were keen to support any 
institutional development that would undermine apartheid. What was less clear, however, was 
whether the scope of their political commitment included a broader commitment, either to the 
Commission as an institution or to human rights enforcement in general. During the debates 
in the drafting process of major human rights treaties such as the ICCPR in the 1960s, some 
of the same states that supported the 1235 and 1503 procedures opposed the development of 
the individual petition procedure.112 In 1977, Patrick Flood noted that Third World bloc states 
opposed the creation of a UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, after Soviet bloc 
countries actively lobbied them against the idea, “[playing] on . . . sensitivities concerning 
their colonial past [in order] to portray the High Commissioner proposal as a neo-colonial 
Trojan Horse.”113 In the 1980s, Manfred Nowak noted that despite a growing international 
consensus to oppose the use of torture, many states from the Third World bloc actively 
opposed setting up a Committee Against Torture.114 More powerful states, such as the Soviet 
Union (later Russia) and the United States, were also strongly opposed to any individual 
petition mechanism in principle, and only strategically supported mechanism when they 
would operate in their interests.  
 
Secondly, there was the broader problem of how to construct an institutional mechanism that 
could engineer the naming and shaming of a state in which human rights abuses were taking 
place, commanding the support of other member states. At the regional level, international 
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human rights protection regimes emerged in tandem with international organizations built 
around projects of political or economic integration. Organizations based on the latter type of 
political project offered different incentives to states in order to gain their initial commitment 
and acceptance of the organization’s power to protect human rights.115 At the international 
level, many states viewed the bodies set up by human rights treaties such as the ICCPR as 
mechanisms for externally signaling their commitment to human rights. For example, there 
was a surge in the number of states signing up to human rights treaties during the so-called 
“third wave of democracy” in the 1990s.116 
 
For a body with a politicized membership tasked with overseeing investigative procedures, as 
was the Commission with its oversight responsibility for the Sub-Commission, the issue was 
how to survive in a world where the question of who is a human rights victim was always 
going to be a politically contested concept. This is the dilemma set out by Makau Mutua in 
the influential paper “Savages, Victims, Saviours.” Mutua argues that the concept of human 
rights is caught up in a “grand narrative” which uses institutional forms and structures to 
create and identify classes of human rights victims who are under attack by “savages” within 
their own society.117 Reform of the Commission in the 1960s took place in the context of 
directly targeting apartheid in South Africa and preserving post-independence self-
determination for former colonies. From the perspective of the Third World bloc, the 
“victims” and “savages” implicit in the 1235 and 1503 procedure only included those 
suffering under the apartheid regime. The wording of both instruments encouraged this 
construction. They were not worded in a way that supported a broader concept of victimhood 
that would encompass all targets of governmental human rights abuses.  
 
Double standards, as they were called, were a function of the way that the 1235 and 1503 
procedures were designed, because the references to apartheid in them could easily be 
interpreted as exclusionary. The control that both procedures gave to the Commission was an 
incentive for blocs of states to seek Commission membership in order to control those 
procedures and defend their member states and their allies in other blocs from human rights 
scrutiny. In December 2004, the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, which 
was tasked with evaluating existing UN institutions, concluded that too many states were 
seeking membership of the Commission “not to strengthen human rights but to protect 
themselves against criticism or to criticize others.”118 As one 2008 study concluded, during 
the last decade of the Commission’s existence, states with bad human rights records were 
more likely to get elected to the Commission than those with good ones.119 None of these 
developments emerged in a vacuum. They were intimately linked with the way the 
Commission’s powers had been designed in the late 1960s. The campaign against apartheid 
South Africa was a powerful catalyst for institutional reform and development of human 
rights law, but some of the changes made at the time were expressly tied into the context of 
apartheid. Conflict over whether they were intended to usher in a broader-based set of 
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institutional reforms cemented a politics of human rights at the Commission that ultimately 
led to its dissolution and replacement. 
 
